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Just a decade ago we witnessed the launch of one ofthe most extraordinary political adventures of the latetwentieth century, the return of freewheeling capital-
ist Hong Kong to an allegedly communist China under
China’s notion of “one country, two systems”—making
Hong Kong a Special Administrative Region of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. This anniversary marks the an-
niversary of a number of other landmarks in Hong Kong
history. Over two decades have passed since the signing
of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration for Hong
Kong’s return. And 17 years have passed since the 1990
enactment of the Hong Kong Basic Law((1), passed on
the heals of China’s harsh crackdown and suppression of
the 1989 demonstrations. This legislation of China’s Na-
tional People’s Congress (NPC) has become the consti-
tution of Hong Kong and charts the roadmap for Hong
Kong’s long-term democratic development. It also affords
constitutional security for Hong Kong’s promised high
degree of autonomy, human rights, and the rule of law.
On account of the guarantees in the Joint Declaration
and the Basic Law countries around the world have en-
tered into numerous international agreements with and
about Hong Kong. 
Less noticed than the tenth anniversary of the handover
was the twentieth anniversary in 2005 of Hong Kong’s
democratisation process. Mainland officials and support-
ers are fond of emphasising that democratisation in Hong
Kong must be gradual and orderly. With the first demo-
cratic election of legislators by 12 functional constituen-
cies in 1985 and the introduction of 18 directly elected
seats in 1991, Hong Kong may have the most gradual and
orderly democratisation process in the world. 
During this first decade since the handover the contradic-
tion between the liberal human rights protections that are
afforded in Hong Kong and continued non-democratic
authoritarian rule has been evident, producing a series of
political crises. In a liberal constitutional environment the
absence of democracy has produced the very instability
that pro-Beijing opponents of democracy seem to most
fear. We have been left to assess the costs of running a
free society under the thumb of China’s authoritarian sys-
tem. Will a system of direct Beijing control underpinned
by a network of political influence by Beijing supporters
continue to be the dominant form of politics in Hong
Kong, or will the constitutional democratic order prom-
ised in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law be per-
mitted to emerge? The wisdom of a decade of experience
may suggest the merits of the latter.
The first decade after the handover has witnessed a vi-
brant democracy movement in Hong Kong and equally vi-
brant Beijing resistance. Political parties have flourished
and pro-democracy politicians have generally done well in
local elections. Mass demonstrations supporting democ-
racy and related human rights concerns have become a
common feature of Hong Kong politics. Pro-Beijing at-
tacks on democracy have likewise persisted and the flag-
ship pro-Beijing political parties have continued to carry
the banner of resistance to democratic reform. In this en-
vironment China’s resistance to democratic development
has become the central plank of Beijing’s Hong Kong
policy. Various official interpretations by Beijing have
scotched any serious efforts at political reform, posing a
fundamental challenge to the “one country, two systems”
model. Will the promised democracy be achieved? Does
Beijing’s stance on democracy pose a risk to the constitu-
tional order and related stability in Hong Kong?
The analysis in the sections that follow lays out the con-
stitutional roadmap for democratisation in Hong Kong,
considers Beijing’s interpretations of the Basic Law’s
democracy requirements, assesses the Hong Kong Gov-
ernment’s efforts at compliance with these dictates, and
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considers the constitutional debate now ensuing over full
realisation of China’s constitutional commitment to full
universal suffrage in Hong Kong. The urgency of China
relaxing its grip on Hong Kong and allowing orderly po-
litical development has become apparent. A failure to
allow an orderly path of democratic development, for a
society clearly ready for democracy, may mean risks for
both China and Hong Kong.The  con st i tut i ona l  f r ameworkfo r  democra t i c  dev e lopment
To understand Hong Kong’s democratic development it
is important to consider the foundational democratic re-
quirements spelled out in the Sino-British Joint Declara-
tion and the Hong Kong Basic Law. The 1984 Sino-
British Joint Declaration embodies China’s design of
“one country, two systems” and signals the democratic
road ahead. Regarding democracy it specifies that the
legislature be chosen by elections and the Chief Execu-
tive by elections or local consultations held locally.
When released in 1984 the Joint Declaration obviously
aimed to promote confidence in Hong Kong’s future. It
promised an anxious Hong Kong a “high degree of au-
tonomy,” and “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong,”
under a liberal system of democracy, human rights and
the rule of law. Hong Kong people were told to “put
their hearts at ease((2).”
Not only did the Joint Declaration seek to reassure
Hong Kong but it also reached out to the international
community. It is important to emphasise that the Joint
Declaration is an international treaty ratified by both
governments and registered with the United Nations as
such. As part of a great effort to garner international sup-
port, the PRC spoke to foreign governments, encourag-
ing their reliance on the “one country, two systems”
framework. Foreign governments were asked to establish
separate economic, social and cultural relations with
Hong Kong and to recognise Hong Kong as a distinct
customs and immigration territory. Unquestionably, this
treaty internationalised the Hong Kong issue and en-
couraged subsequent international concern over Hong
Kong’s democratic development. 
The Basic Law takes up the Joint Declaration’s demo-
cratic commitments in Articles 45 and 68, supplemented
by Annexes I and II respectively. These provisions allow
full democracy to be instituted after 2007 through elec-
tions for both the Chief Executive and the Legislative
Council (hereinafter “Legco”)((3). Article 45 of the
Basic Law provides: 
The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be
specified in light of the actual situation … in accordance
with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The
ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by
universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly repre-
sentative nominating committee in accordance with dem-
ocratic procedures. 
Triggering the current democratic reform debate, Basic
Law, Annex I specifies election of the Chief Executive
by a “broadly representative” election committee in the
first two terms but provides in Annex I, Article 7 for po-
tentially expanding the level of democracy, as follows:
7. If there is a need to amend the method for selecting
the Chief Executives for the terms subsequent to the
year 2007, such amendments must be made with the en-
dorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of
the Legislative Council and the consent of the Chief Ex-
ecutive, and they shall be reported to the Standing Com-
mittee of the National People’s Congress for approval. 
“Universal suffrage” is the “ultimate aim” specified in
both articles 45 and 68, for the Chief Executive and
Legco respectively. Article 68 provides essentially the
same procedures respecting Legco’s electoral reform, ex-
cept that there is no need for a nominating committee
and the provision on changing the method in Annex II,
Article III expressly requires only that proposed changes
be reported to the Standing Committee of the NPC “for
the record((4).” Under the formula specified in Basic Law
Annex II the number of directly elected Legco seats has
already expanded incrementally to the current 30. There
are also 30 members representing various functional con-
stituencies—from business, social and professional
groups. A government proposal to expand both func-
tional and directly elected seats equally by five was de-
feated by the democrats in Legco in 2005. From this
point forward this 30-30 formula will remain operative
until the method is changed as specified.
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2. Michael C. Davis, “Constitutionalism in Hong Kong: Politics Versus Economics,” Jour-
nal of International Economic Law, 18 March 1997, p. 155. 
3. Basic Law, Articles 45 and 68 and Annexes I and II.
4. Annex II, part III provides, “With regard to the method for forming the Legislative
Council … and its procedures for voting on bills and motions after 2007, if there is
a need to amend the provisions of this Annex, such amendments must be made with
the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Council and the
consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be reported to the Standing Commit-
tee of the National People’s Congress for the record.”
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Under severe public pressure for a faster pace of democ-
racy, on 6 April 2004, the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress (NPCSC) moved to offer its
own interpretation of the above noted Annex I, Article 7
and Annex II, Article III in relevant parts as follows:
The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall make a report to the
Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress as regards whether there is a need to
make an amendment; and the Standing Commit-
tee of the National People’s Congress shall, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Articles 45 and 68
of the Basic Law… , make a determination in the
light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region and in accordance with
the principles of gradual and orderly progress. The
bills on the amendments to the method for select-
ing the Chief Executive and the method of form-
ing the Legislative Council and its procedures for
voting on bills and motions and the proposed
amendments to such bills shall be introduced by
the Government … into the Legislative Council((5).
The interpretation effectively amounted to an amendment
of the Basic Law. It gives the Chief Executive complete
control of any initiation of democratic reform and the cen-
tral government veto power. Procedurally this appears to
contradict Article 159, which specifies its own method of
Basic Law amendment, requiring approval by the full
NPC and specifying that amendments not contravene the
basic policies of the PRC listed in the Joint Declaration. 
The interpretation also appears to contradict the above
noted Annex II, Article III specification that changes in
the method of electing the Legco need only be reported
to the NPC Standing Committee “for the record.” The
PRC government had not always taken the view that it
could intervene so readily in this democratic reform deci-
sion. In a comment in the People’s Daily on 18 March
1993, the then Director of the Hong Kong and Macau
Affairs Office, Mr. Lu Ping, stated, “As for how the leg-
islature will be constituted after its third term, all that is
needed is for two-thirds of legislators to approve, the chief
executive to give his consent, and then report to the
Standing Committee of the NPC for the record. There is
no need for Central Government approval. How Hong
Kong develops democracy in the future is entirely within
the autonomy of Hong Kong((6).” This statement from the
leading Beijing official responsible for Hong Kong
seemed to put the initiative and final decision for reform-
ing the election of the Legco squarely on the local Hong
Kong Government. Under the formula articulated in the
interpretation, the Legislative Council can at best serve as
a source of political pressure, perhaps by resolution, and
approve or disapprove any final change to the methods of
selection—an option the Legco embraced in rejecting the
late 2005 government proposals.
Any doubts whether Beijing planned to use its newly
found power to obstruct democracy were quickly dis-
pelled. The 6 April interpretation was followed after just
ten days by a report by a government task force on consti-
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5. The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of
Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, Adopted by the Stand-
ing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress at its Eighth Session on 6
April 2004, L.N. 54 of 2004 of the Hong Kong Gazette, L.S. No l2 to Gazette Ext. No.
5/2004, reproduced in Chan and Harris, supra note 2 (“6 April NPC Standing Com-
mittee interpretation”), paragraph 3.
6. Frank Ching, “Be Consistent,” South China Morning Post, 30 March 2004 (pointing
out this earlier statement).
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tutional reform. This was followed immediately by the
Chief Executive’s report specifying that there was a need
to change the method for selecting the Chief Executive
and forming the Legislative Council((7). While specifying
such need the Chief Executive’s report added further ob-
stacles to genuine change. It expressed concern about
Hong Kong’s political maturity and specified nine condi-
tions that needed to be satisfied in determining demo-
cratic reform. By specifying how the “actual situation”
would be evaluated, the Chief Executive’s report ap-
peared to add to the Basic Law requirements. Both re-
ports emphasised the lack of political maturity of Hong
Kong politicians and political groups, the need for differ-
ent sectors of society to be represented (code for func-
tional constituencies) and that “the pace should not be too
fast.” They also emphasised that changes should not have
any adverse economic effect. 
The NPC Standing Committee replied to the Chief Ex-
ecutive’s Report on 26 April 2004, expressly prohibiting
expansion of direct elections in 2007 and 2008((8). In this
decision, the Standing Committee specified that the
Chief Executive must continue to be selected by the exist-
ing Election Committee in 2007—though the size of the
Election Committee could be expanded—and that the
ratio of directly elected to functional legislators must be
maintained at the same 50-50 ratio for the 2008 Legco
election((9). This decision effectively prevented any serious
democratic reform. The only reform options left open for
the 2007-8 elections was to increase the size of the Elec-
tion Committee and the Legco while essentially not ad-
vancing democratisation in relative or participatory terms.
In October 2005 the Government put forth its reform pro-
posal to double the Election Committee membership to
1,600, with the bulk of such additions coming from mem-
bers of the District Councils (both elected and appointed
members), and adding five directly elected and five func-
tional seats to Legco, with the functional seats all to be
chosen by the District Council members((10). The demo-
cratic camps raised an outcry and voted the proposals
down in Legco, where a two-thirds vote was required((11). The  2007  con st i tut i ona l  de -ba te  and  b eyond
Hong Kong is now at a new phase in its constitutional de-
bate over democracy, anticipating elections for Legco and
the Chief Executive in 2012. A government-appointed
Commission on Strategic Development is preparing to
issue its report on political reform in mid-summer 2007.
This will be followed later in the year by a green paper
and government consultation. Hong Kong is again wit-
nessing the usual display of resistance to democratic re-
form from the pro-Beijing camp. This resistance is usually
camouflaged in suggestions embodying obstacles to demo-
cratic participation that are argued to meet Basic Law re-
quirements. The central objective appears to be to struc-
ture Legco to keep democrats in minority and to structure
the nomination process for the Chief Executive in such a
way as to block candidates from the democratic camp.
The former usually involves efforts in Legco to preserve
functional constituencies; the latter usually seeks to incor-
porate a mechanism to vet candidates for Chief Executive
in the Nominating Committee required under the Basic
Law. 
Article 45 of the Basic Law, as noted above, specifies
that, “The ultimate aim is selection of the Chief Execu-
tive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly
representative nominating committee in accordance with
democratic procedures.” Article 45 also gives Beijing the
power to appoint any Chief Executive so chosen, a power
that Beijing has long insisted is substantive—meaning they
can also reject unacceptable candidates. If the threshold
for nomination is not made too high, both democrats and
pro-government forces tend to generally accept that the
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7. The Second Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force, Issues of Principle
in the Basic Law Relating to Constitutional Development, April 16, 2004, reproduced
in Chan and Harris, supra note 2 (“Second Task Force Report”); Report on Whether
There is a Need to Amend the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region in 2007 and for Forming the Legislative Council
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2008, report of the Chief Execu-
tive, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Hong Kong, 15 April 2004, repro-
duced in Chan and Harris, supra note 2 (Chief Executive’s Report).
8. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Relevant
Issues Concerning Methods for Selecting the HKSAR Chief Executive in 2007 and for
Forming the Legislative Council in 2008, 26 April 2004, reproduced in Chan and Har-
ris, supra note 2.
9. Note the 800-member Election Committee is chosen mostly by functional categories
of electors representing commercial, professional and social interests. The existing
categories have tended toward a pro-government and pro-Beijing orientation. The
government can also count on the support of the vast majority of functional legisla-
tors.
10. The Fifth Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force, Package of Proposals
for the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive in 2007 and for Forming the Leg-
islative Council in 2008, October 2005, www.cab.gov.hk/cd/text/eng/
report5/index.htm, accessed 7 March 2006, paras. 5.04 and 5.17 (Fifth Task Force
Report). For the Election Committee to choose the Chief Executive, the Government
recommended that 800 seats be added with approximately 500 including all mem-
bers of the District Councils and the additional 300 seats coming from existing func-
tional categories—with the details to be supplied later in a legislative amendment
bill. For Legco, all five new functional seats were to be elected by the District Coun-
cils, with the method of this likewise to be determined in subsequent legislation. The
proposals were rejected by Legco.
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Nominating Committee can be based on the existing Elec-
tion Committee, currently made up of functional members
and existing legislators. Democrats see this not-so-represen-
tative committee as the path of least resistance, as long as
it can produce a democratic candidate. The Election Com-
mittee has historically had a distinctly pro-Beijing bias. In
the first two post-handover Chief Executive selections
under the Election Committee only one pro-Beijing candi-
date could muster the 100 nominations needed and ran un-
opposed before the Election Committee. In the third such
selection in 2007 the democratic camp made a concerted
effort to secure enough nominations for Alan Leung of the
Civic Party to run as a formal candidate. He could marshal
only 132 nominations and 123 votes in the ultimate selec-
tion by the 800-member Election Committee. Beijing’s
favoured candidate Donald Tsang not only won that selec-
tion but appeared to have strong support in public opinion
polls. Instead of seeing in this the possibility of pro-Beijing
candidates doing well in a popular election Beijing officials
and pro-Beijing politicians have been shocked that the
democratic candidate even secured nomination. 
This Beijing anxiety has set the stage for the current crit-
ical constitutional debate over democratisation, the debate
over the make-up and functioning of the Nominating Com-
mittee. The Beijing camp seems as determined as ever to
block democrats from political power. The constitutional
path to this objective under universal suffrage appears to
be some mechanism in the required Nominating Commit-
tee to block pan-democratic candidates that are judged un-
acceptable to Beijing. Given statements of concern re-
cently coming from the Beijing camp, the likelihood that
some such nominating model to eliminate unacceptable
democratic candidates will emerge from the Commission
on Strategic Development or later in the process seems
high. There is a similar likelihood that functional con-
stituencies will be maintained.
A couple of models with a strong likelihood of blocking
democrats from any popular Chief Executive election
have already been devised. The pro-government Business
and Professional Federation has put forth a proposal that
would require that a nominee receive at least twenty nom-
inations from each of the economic, professional, social
and political sectors of the Nominating Committee (being
one based on the Election Committee model)—given the
committee make-up, a daunting challenge for democ-
rats((12). “Beijing sources” have noted that Beijing is taking
a keen interest in this and have predicted an even more re-
strictive nominating process requiring the Nominating
Committee to make a “collective decision” on what candi-
dates go forward to popular election((13). This appears to
signal support for a proposal already put forward by the
Basic Law Institute whereby a candidate could be nomi-
nated by 50 nominators in the Nominating Committee but
then the full Nominating Committee must select two
favoured candidates to present to the public. The chance
of a democrat clearing the latter process is slim.
Of course, there continues to be a debate over whether
universal suffrage will be implemented at all—at least in
the short term. In a recent seemingly unguarded moment,
the Chair of the pro-Beijing DAB party, Ma Lik, caused
a public outcry, when he argued that Hong Kong would
not be ready for universal suffrage until 2022 because
Hong Kong people lacked national identity. He based this
conclusion on the refusal of Hong Kong people to accept
Beijing’s account of the 1989 massacre at Tiananmen,
which he attributed to a lack of proper “national educa-
tion((14).” As the opposition, the democratic camp contin-
ues to push for prompt democratisation. For democrats de-
mocratisation must at a minimum include a mechanism
that can produce a democratic Chief Executive candidate
for popular election and must include abolition of the
Legco functional constituencies((15).
The Hong Kong government has generally remained non-
committal on these issues. The government’s Secretary for
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11. K.C. Ng and Philip Pan, “Hong Kong Democrats Blast Reform Plan,” Washington Post,
13 October 2005.
12. David Akers-Jones, “The Election Committee Should be the Basis for a Popular Elec-
tion in 2012, Circle of Trust,” South China Morning Post, 16 April 2007, A17.
13. Klaudia Lee, “Selection of CE Hopefuls Reviewed,” South China Morning Post, 22 May
2007, A1.
14. Ambrose Leung, “HK Not Ready for Universal Suffrage Because of Unpatriotic View
of June 4, says Ma Lik, Fury at DAB Chief’s Tiananmen Tirade,” South China Morn-
ing Post, 16 May 2007, A1.
15. The common characteristic of democratic camp proposals is a low nomination
threshold for nomination in the Nominating Committee and abolition of functional
constituencies. Twenty-one pan-democratic legislators have again put forth a pro-
posal for universal suffrage by 2012 along these lines. National Democratic Institute,
The Promise of Democratization in Hong Kong, The 2007 Chief Executive Election,
NDI Hong Kong Report No. 11, 30 April 2007, at 17-18. A “core group” formed by the
former Chief Secretary, Anson Chan envisions broadening the franchise of the 800
member Election Committee to form the Nominating Committee for Chief Executive,
with a 10% threshold for nomination; and regrouping and broadening the functional
constituencies for Legco into ten multi-seat constituencies for the coming 2008
election to be phased out in 2012, though her proposal allows some compromise to
extend 15 regrouped (under three constituencies) functional seats for abolition be-
fore the 2016 election.. Ambrose Leung, et al., “Anson Chan Unveils Political Reform
Road Map,” South China Morning Post, 6 March 2007, A1; Ambrose Leung, et al.,
“Anson Chan Lays Down Her Vision for Trade-based Seats,” South China Morning
Post, 6 March 2007, A2.
16. Mr. Lam gave no clear indication of how the nominating committee might function.
Klaudia Lee, “Chief Executive Election ‘Open to Democracy,’” South China Morning
Post, 16 November 2003, 2.
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Constitutional Affairs, Stephen Lam, previously indicated
that the government would not block democrats from run-
ning for Chief Executive((16). Of course, running and actu-
ally having a chance at nomination are two different things.
The Government now puts its hopes in the report of its
Commission on Strategic Development due out this sum-
mer, from which a Green Paper will be compiled for pub-
lic consultation. That Commission has seemingly ruled out
vetting candidates for Chief Executive, but it is difficult to
judge what exactly this means until its final report is out((17).
It has been reported that the Commission will put forth
three electoral proposals for inclusion in the consultative
Green Paper. One must wait to see if avenues for exclud-
ing democrats will come in under different strategies such
as those suggested above. Secretary Stephen Lam has even
tried to make the case that functional constituencies do not
contradict the requirements of “universal suffrage((18).”
Interpreting these constitutional requirements under the
Hong Kong Basic Law will be the biggest constitutional
challenge of the coming few years. Any failure to achieve
genuine universal suffrage with popular access to the po-
litical process will surely be judged a failure of compliance
with the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic
Law. In particular, a process of vetting or restricting top
offices to a few unpopular Beijing supporters will surely
result in continued public opposition and mass protest. If
the experience of the past ten years is any indication such
failure will also leave Hong Kong with a weak political
system prone to crises and public confrontation. After one
of the most “gradual and orderly” efforts at democratisa-
tion in history Hong Kong appears ready for a more ma-
ture fully democratic constitutional process. Meeting the
challenges of the coming decade appears to greatly de-
pend on adjustments in perspective and strong leadership
in the Hong Kong and Beijing governments, as well as
more mature democratic engagement by their supporters.
Future Hong Kong leaders will surely be judged by their
capacity to meet this constitutional challenge. •
33N o  2 0 0 7 / 2
17. Ambrose Leung, “Beijing Vetting of Hopefuls Ruled Out,” South China Morning Post,
24 November 2006, A2.
18. Eddie Luk, “Functional Constituency Elections do not Contradict Universal Suffrage,”
China Daily, 27 January 2005.
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